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ABSTRACT

Anti-State Criminal Violence as Civil Defense

by

Tyler S. Thomas, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2020

Major Professor: Dr. Laura Gamboa-Gutierrez
Department: Political Science

In this thesis, I developed a civil defense theory to explain anti-state violence
orchestrated by organized crime. I first review the literature examining the causes of the
onset and intensity of anti-state criminal violence. Structural, organizational, cultural,
institutional, and state-centered theories have provided effective explanations for the
violence, but are hampered by the assumption that criminal groups are only driven by
economic and self-interested motives. I build on these theories by relaxing this
assumption and putting forward a more nuanced explanation.
I argue that organized crime will be more likely to commit anti-state violence
when state enforcement agents commit a serious grievance against the local population
with whom the criminals share a social identity. I use process tracing to explore the
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causal mechanisms that connect state sponsored violence with community grievance and
anti-state violence by the Michoacán Family and its later iteration, the Knights Templar.
Using primary and secondary sources, I examine the social identities connecting
criminals to local communities and how these social identities could lead members of
organized crime to attack the state. The evidence gathered suggests that my theory
provides a good pathway to explain anti-state violence, but is not exhaustive. I therefore
end the thesis with a discussion on further research needed to better explain the role of
social identities in this phenomenon.
(82 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Anti-State Criminal Violence as Civil Defense
Tyler S. Thomas

Anti-state criminal violence is a puzzle. Criminal organizations should avoid
violent interactions with the state, yet in several countries like Brazil, Mexico, and
Colombia there has been widespread anti-state violence orchestrated by organized
criminal groups for the past 25 years. Why?
Building on existing literature, I develop a theory with which to explain anti-state
criminal violence. I argue that organized crime is more likely to commit anti-state
violence when state enforcement agents commit a serious grievance against the local
population with whom the criminals share a social identity. I develop this theory using
the case of the Michoacán Family, later known as the Knights Templar. I find that
members of this group identify with their community and frame violence in terms of
“defense” of said community. While not exhaustive, this study suggests that group
identity is an important factor behind criminal anti-state violence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The existence of massive anti-state criminal violence in countries like Mexico,
Brazil, Jamaica, El Salvador, Iraq, Colombia, Italy, and Russia is a paradox. According to
much of the current research, organized criminal groups are thought to be primarily
motivated by economic profit, generated by the provision of illegal goods and services,
economic predation, and the selling of protection. Lest they provoke the state into
repressing and disrupting their lucrative activities, they should avoid attacking the state
when possible (Bailey & Taylor 2009; Finckenauer 2005; Gambetta 1993; Schelling
1971; Skaperdas 2001). They should seek to optimize the political environment rather
than dismantle it. They should choose to either hide their activities from the state or
include state agents in their operations in the form of bribery (Lessing 2018).
Nonetheless, some criminal group launch massive attacks against the state. In
countries such as Brazil and Mexico, these attacks have been conducted by hundreds of
criminal soldiers in widespread guerrilla fighting, from the mountains of Mexico’s
Michoacán state to the slums of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (Grillo 2016, Lessing 2018). In
Colombia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, anti-state criminal attacks took a
particularly heavy toll on Colombian society as the Medellín Cartel targeted Colombian
politicians in terrorist strikes which blew up cars and airplanes (Bowden 2001).
Thousands of civilians have been killed as a result of these conflicts.
Building on existing approaches, I outline a theory that explains both the onset
and intensity of anti-state criminal violence. Unlike other approaches, however, I
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complicate the motivations and incentives of criminals, relaxing the economic and selfinterested assumptions that create the anti-state violence paradox. I argue that organized
crime will commit anti-state criminal violence when state enforcement agents commit a
serious grievance against the local population with whom the criminals share a social
identity. I illustrate this theory using process tracing to explore the causal mechanisms of
anti-state violence. I use the Michoacán Family, later known as the Knights Templar, as
my case study, situated in the Mexican state of Michoacán.
In what follows, I begin by reviewing the literature on the causes of anti-state
criminal violence. Building on this literature, in the third chapter, I introduce my theory
on the civil defense model. The fourth chapter outlines the methodological approach. The
fifth chapter analyzes the social identity that connects criminals to the local population
that could lead them to violence in defense of civilians. The sixth chapter analyzes the
conflict of the Michoacán Family and the Knights Templar (MF/KT) with the federal
government and how the social identities of criminals may lead to anti-state violence. The
evidence suggests that the path I outline in this thesis is plausible and useful to better
understand the drivers of anti-state criminal violence. I then conclude with a discussion
on further research needed to confirm my theory.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are five main approaches used to explain anti-state criminal violence:
structural, organizational, cultural, institutional, and state-centered. These theories make
important contributions to our understanding of the onset and intensity of anti-state
criminal violence. I summarize them below.

Goods and Services
Structural approaches explore the impact of the value and nature of illegal goods
and services on anti-state criminal violence. Scholars in this camp claim that anti-state
violence is an inherent part of the business of organized criminal activity (Williams
2010). If illegal goods and services provided by organized crime, such as drugs,
counterfeit products, and trafficking or protection services, are sufficiently valuable,
criminals will be willing to use violence in order to control and protect them from state
agents, as well as from other criminals (Reuter 2009). Moreover, some of these services
require violence in order for organized criminal groups to signal to clients, victims, rival
criminals and state agents that they can control markets, eliminate rivals, and enforce
contracts (Castillo, Mejia, & Restrepo 2013; Durán-Martínez 2015; Gambetta 1996;
Spence 2002).
Structural theories of anti-state criminal violence can explain why organized
criminal interactions with each other and with the state will generally include more

4
violence than those of legal organizations (Grossman 1997; Paoli 2002). However,
despite the often-substantial value of illegal goods and services, organized criminal
groups are not equally violent (Friman 2009). Illegality does not necessarily breed
violence (Kan 2012; Snyder & Durán-Martínez 2009). Nor do the value of goods
generate violence (Durán-Martínez 2015; Shirk & Wallman 2015). While this approach
may explain the tendency toward anti-state violence due to illegality and protectionism, it
does not explain its onset or varying intensity (Andreas & Wallman 2009).

Criminal Capacities for Violence
Organizational approaches focus on the capability that organized crime has for
anti-state violence and the vulnerability of the state (Williams 2009a). Violence results
when organized criminal groups have a high capacity for violence (Brands 2009). The
availability of weapons, recruits, and particularly specialists in violent behavior allow
organized criminal groups to effectively use increased amounts of violence against the
state (Brophy 2008; Campbell 2010; Dube, Dube, & Garcia-Ponce 2013; Grillo 2011;
Hagedorn 2005; Lloyd 2007; Logan & Grayson 2015; Sampson 1993; Sullivan & Elkus
2008; Tilly 2003; Williams 2009a; 2010; 2012). Their ability to damage the state is
further enhanced if it lacks the tools to suppress organized crime, either due to a lack of
the resources required to project power throughout its territory or due to pervasive
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corruption within the ranks of its agents (Durán-Martínez 2015; Metz 1993; Skaperdas
2001; Sullivan & Elkus 2008).
While successful in explaining intensity, this approach does not explain the onset
of anti-state violence. Organized crime is not inherently eager to attack the state and
those whom it protects (Williams 2010). The objectives of organized crime are assumed
to be primarily economic, not political (Kalyvas 2015). As stated by Paul Kan, “The main
goals for a criminal organization are the generation and accumulation of profit. High
levels of violence associated with warfare can often hamper the achievement of these
goals for criminals” (Kan 2009, 25-26). As long as the state engages in activity that
allows organized crime to make money, such organizations have no incentive to violently
challenge the state, regardless of its relative power. Indeed, it is often necessary for
organized crime to work with state agents for their criminal activities to thrive (Flom
2019).

Violent Criminal Culture
Cultural approaches argue that anti-state criminal violence is the result of the
internal culture of organized criminal groups. Violence is understood as an acceptable
and preferable solution for conflict. Frequent violence within a society can cause the
collapse of societal norms against violent behavior (Bowden 2010; Buvinic, Morrison, &
Shifter 1999; Williams 2010). The impact of this collapse carries over into organized
criminal groups (Williams 2009a; 2012). A violent culture may also develop from within.
For example, recruiting individuals who favorably view violent solutions to problems
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into the group’s membership can lead to more violent behavior pursued by the group as a
whole (Lloyd 2007; Logan & Grayson 2015; Weeks 2014; Williams & Godson 2002;
Williams 2009a). This violent internal criminal culture can spread to other groups
through imitation should their practices be deemed effective (Logan & Grayson 2015;
Shirk 2011; Sullivan & Elkus 2008).
Cultural arguments help explain the intensity of anti-state violence. With a
breakdown in societal norms against violent behavior, organized criminals may feel less
hesitant to engage in it. Violence against state agents may be followed by reprisals and
repeating cycles of violent revenge (Williams 2012). However, while this argument may
explain a cultural feedback process whereby violent behavior gains acceptance as a
solution to conflicts, it does not explain the onset of violence. Organized crime still has
an incentive to avoid anti-state violence, and therefore should seek to avoid setting up a
violent cultural feedback process.

Political-Criminal Nexus and Criminal Turf War
Institutional approaches examine the impact of breakdowns in the politicalcriminal nexus and of criminal turf wars on anti-state criminal violence. They initially
explore the political-criminal nexus (Godson 2003; Williams 2010). Violence occurs
when state protection agreements with organized criminal groups are disrupted, leading
to a period of transitional violence as groups attempt to reestablish and persuade state
agents to form new agreements (Freeman 2006; Grayson 2010a; Shirk & Wallman 2015;
Trejo & Ley 2017). This breakdown may have many causes, such as the collapse of the
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state or a turnover in democratic elections (Astorga & Shirk 2010; Dube et al. 2013; Kan
2011; O’Neil 2009; Rios 2015; Trejo & Ley 2017; Williams 2009b). Violence may
become especially intense if organized criminal groups find the state hesitant to form new
protection agreements with them. This can occur when newly elected officials see it as an
electoral mandate to crush organized crime or when there is an increase in state agents
who refuse to be corrupted into making new agreements (Shirk & Wallman 2015; Osorio
2013; 2015).
The breakdown in state protection agreements can also lead to criminal turf wars.
Organized criminal groups, no longer under the protection of the state, may attempt to
seize resources from other groups as they strive to protect their own (Trejo & Ley 2017).
Criminals will sometimes attack the state in order to signal strength and resolve to their
rivals (Calderón, Robles, Díaz-Cayeros, & Magaloni 2015; Durán-Martínez 2015;
Lessing 2015; Spence 2002). This is particularly true when groups are suffering
fragmentation and internal disruption, sometimes caused by state repression strategies
(Calderón et al. 2015; Dickenson 2014; Shirk & Wallman 2015). Organized crime will
attack state agents if they ally with rivals or compete in the provision of illegal goods and
services (Bowden 2009; Grillo 2011; Kan 2011). Groups will also attack the state within
a rival’s territory in order to trick it into repressing their rivals (Lessing 2015).

State Repression
State-Centered approaches explain anti-state criminal violence as the result of
state repression (Williams 2010). The state attempts to repress organized crime when it
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tries to destroy their criminal organizations, stop their criminal activities, and arrest or
kill their members. State repression endangers criminal profits (Brands 2009; Grillo
2011; Kan 2011; Sullivan & Elkus 2008). Repression therefore gives criminal groups an
incentive to engage in violence against the state, although this incentive can be altered
using conditional rather than unconditional repressive strategies (Lessing 2018). When
the state represses, organized crime responds with progressive strategies of non-violent
lobbying and corruption, followed by violent lobbying and corruption in order to
intimidate and convince the state and its agents to back off from enforcement (Beittel
2019; Brands 2009; Kan 2011; Lessing 2015; Lessing 2018; Mandel 2011; Schelling
1966; Sullivan & Elkus 2008; Thomas, Kiser, & Casebeer 2005).
Institutional and state-centered approaches explain both onset and intensity of
anti-state violence. Building on these approaches, I propose an alternative pathway. All
of the theories summarized above assume that criminals are driven by economic
incentives solely. There is evidence, however, that they can have other incentives and
motivations besides economic profit, such as a desire to show loyalty to their
communities (Brewer; 2009; Carpenter 2013; Rodgers & Jensen 2008; Ward 2012). I
believe that these other incentives can also lead to anti-state violence. I therefore relax the
self-interested, economic assumptions of the literature to allow for a more thorough
exploration of the causes of anti-state criminal violence.
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CHAPTER 3
CIVIL DEFENCE MODEL FOR ANTI-STATE CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

I argue that organized crime will commit anti-state violence when state
enforcement agents commit a serious grievance against the local population with whom
the criminals share a social identity. In the following paragraphs, I explain what I mean
by serious grievance and a shared social identity and their part in driving members of
organized crime to attack state law enforcement agents.
Organized crime, in its purest form, is apolitical in motivation. Its objective is the
generation of illicit profits. While it may involve itself in politics, this is mostly to
maintain an environment in which it can maximize its revenue. This is often done by
involving public officials and law enforcement in criminal activities (Kelly 2003).
However, while the generation of profit may be the central motivation for forming
a criminal enterprise, it does not mean that its members are purely motivated by selfenrichment. For example, members of the Los Angeles-based street gang Mara
Salvatrucha, commonly known as MS-13, join the group for a variety of non-economic
reasons. Some join to obtain a sense of belonging. Others join for protection (Ward
2012). While wealth and material comforts may motivate some members, especially
leadership, they do not necessarily motivate all members. Both economic and noneconomic motivations may exist within the criminal organization.
I argue that an attachment to their local communities may motivate some
criminals more or as much as personal self-enrichment. Members of organized crime
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often work where they live. Some have grown up or lived among these communities for
many years. They often have well-developed familial, filial, religious, ethnic, and cultural
ties that connect them with their members. It is no surprise that they may naturally care
for their communities and wish to preserve them and their members from harm. They
may even see their criminal enterprises as opportunities to assist their local communities.
These social ties between the criminals and the local community are what
terrorism analyst Marc Sageman calls “social identities” (Sageman 2016). These
identities do not necessarily drive those who embrace them to violence against the state.
In order to turn them into mechanisms for violent anti-state action, they must first be
politicized (Sageman 2016). In other words, these identities and those who hold them
must feel like their community is being harmed or is in danger of being treated unfairly.
There must be a grievance committed against them or the threat of one. A grievance
would politicize the identity and unite the community in action against the injustice, with
individual members acting on behalf of the whole.
Grievances can often come in the form of political, economic, and human rights
abuses committed by state actors (Mena & Hobbs 2010; Human Rights Watch 2011).
Human rights abuses by state law enforcement agents during state-criminal war can be
particularly impactful (Cavallaro & Monteiro 1996). For example, Brazilian police forces
are notoriously violent in their conflicts with organized crime. Since the 1980s, Brazil has
been engaged in an ongoing conflict with criminal groups. These groups have dominated
the favelas (shantytowns) of major cities such as Rio de Janeiro. From time to time,
Brazil’s heavily militarized police forces have raided the favelas, attempting to kill and
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capture as many drug traffickers as they can (Lessing 2018). During these violent
incursions, the police will often abuse the favela residents, whom they frequently view as
enemies working with the drug syndicates (Lessing 2018).
This police mentality leads to high death tolls. In 2017, Brazilian police killed a
total of 5,144 people in Brazil, up 20% from 2016 (Human Rights Watch 2019). Due in
part to poor record keeping by Brazilian law enforcement, it is unclear how many of these
killings were justified. According to the police ombudsman of São Paulo, who examined
hundreds of such killings in the city, the police used excessive force in three-fourths of
them, with at least some of the victims unarmed (Human Rights Watch 2019).
These abuses can result in the formation of a politicized us versus them mentality
in the harmed communities, with law enforcement understood as the enemy. This is
especially true when civilians perceive the violence and abuse to be indiscriminate,
targeting civilians based on community membership, rather than selective, based on
individual civilian behavior (Kalyvas 2000). In response to the threat, community
members then proceed to ally themselves with those who share similar social identities
against the injustices of the aggressor in common defense.
Once a social identity has been politicized, communities will often act and
attempt to correct the injustice. They may do this through peaceful means, such as
through public demonstrations and protests (Sageman 2016). However, some community
members may not confine their political action to only peaceful methods. Some may
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instead self-categorize themselves as soldiers who need to defend their community
violently (Sageman 2016).
Violent action is particularly suited to members of organized crime. Criminals are
engaged in enterprises outside the law. They are therefore already a target of state law
enforcement, and while violence in defense of their fellow citizens might encourage more
state repression, it is not a challenge with which they are unfamiliar. They also have the
means to engage in violent action. Organized crime is often structured into hierarchies
fashioned for pursuing common goals. Organized criminal groups also tend to be wellarmed, with a culture already accepting of violent action to achieve goals. It is therefore
not particularly difficult for organized crime to move into a new identity as community
protectors willing to use violent action to discourage further abuse.
The adoption of this violent community protector identity can be particularly
impactful if criminal leaders, as opposed to rank and file members, are those who adopt
it. Leaders shape the social identity and norms of groups (Sageman 2016). If they begin
to take on the role of community protector, many of their followers will likely adopt it as
well. Even if many group members do not adopt the identity and ideologies of its leaders,
a common occurrence in other violent non-state actor groups such as insurgents, this is
not likely to matter much if the leaders are able to maintain control of their organization
and its goals (Ribetti 2007).
While my main argument is that members of organized crime adopt a protector
role out of a sincerely held social identity and affinity with local communities, it is also
possible for criminals to adopt this protector role for instrumental reasons. Whether
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criminals share an identity or affinity with local communities or not, acting as if they did
can provide many benefits. The adoption of the protector role may help maintain
organizational cohesion, recruit new members from the local community and win over
skeptical civilians. Even if the protector identity is instrumental, it is prudent for criminal
groups to adopt in order to establish themselves securely within the communities where
they operate and effectively resist the incursions of rival criminal groups or the repression
of the government.
However, the question of identity versus instrumentality need not force us to
understand members of organized crime as only having one motivation and not the other.
They may be motivated by both. A criminal may wish to protect the community he cares
about, while at the same time understand and use the instrumental benefits of the
protector identity to benefit himself. Ultimately, identifying what the motivation is for the
adoption of the protector identity is less important than recognizing whether or not the
identity is being adopted.
Having adopted a protector identity, organized criminal groups may now proceed
to engage in anti-state violence. The violence, however, cannot merely be defensive in
nature. The reason for this is that defensive violence is the violence that results when
criminals are caught engaging in illegal activities. Rather than run or hide, they fight the
law enforcement agents who have caught them at their work. The point of this violence is
to decrease their monetary losses and protect themselves, not to protect civilians through
avenging or deterring attacks (Lessing 2018). The violence engaged in by organized
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crime must be offensive in nature, the hunting out and ambushing of state agents in order
to avenge civilian abuse and deter its occurrence.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

In order to develop this theory, I use process tracing to explore the causal
mechanisms that connect this protector identity to anti-state violence in the case of the
Michoacán Family and its later iteration as the Knights Templar, located in Michoacán
(Mexico).

Case Selection
Organized crime is present in several countries throughout the world. I therefore
had many candidates from which to choose my case. To ensure the availability of recent
sources, I decided to select an organized criminal group in a country that is currently
experiencing large-scale criminal-state conflict. With an ongoing conflict, often described
as an insurgency, that has left 62,000 people missing and 150,000 dead since 2006,
Mexico was a good country from which to select my case (Beittel 2019; Grillo 2011;
Philips 2020).
There are at least nine major organized criminal organizations operating in
Mexico: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix Cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes
Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, the Michoacán Family, the
Knights Templar, and the Cartel Jalisco – New Generation (Beittel 2019). In order to
study the causal mechanism and demonstrate my theory’s plausibility, I selected a
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pathway case, one which clearly shows the causal mechanism—the Michoacán Family or
(as parts of it were later known) the Knights Templar (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016).
The Michoacán Family, situated in the Mexican state of Michoacán, announced
its presence in September 2006. Unlike some organized criminal groups, such the Zetas,
the Michoacán Family perceived itself as more than an organized criminal group. Some
of its members saw themselves as community defenders, duty bound to protect
Michoacán’s inhabitants from the predations of other criminals. In response to its
violence, the federal government launched a campaign to destroy it in December 2006.
In the midst of its war with the federal government, the group broke apart and,
after a short civil war, reformed itself as the Knights Templar. The Knights Templar were
a more extreme version of the Michoacán Family. It claimed the protective mantle of the
Michoacán Family (Grillo 2016; Lemus 2015). However, it also added to it, adopting
imagery and symbols that increased their affiliation with a protective identity, in this case
that of Templar Knights, evoking the Medieval Christian order tasked with protecting
pilgrims and sacred sites and artifacts in the Holy Land. Indeed, the Knights’ own
explanation for the split and reformation of the Michoacán Family was to eliminate
predatory elements of their organization so as to better complete their protective mission.
As a result, both the Family and the Knights were made up of similar leadership
and personnel. This close association has led some researchers, such as Falko Ernst, to
make no distinction between the organizations, referring to both of them as the Knights
Templar in his 2015 study (Ernst 2015). Lest an analysis of the Family be less effective
by excluding the Knights or vice versa, I include both to ensure a comprehensive

17
analysis. I also include both to help show the increasingly protective positions claimed by
the personnel and leadership throughout their conflict with the federal government. I
chose the Family and the Knights (MF/KT) because they demonstrated a strong “social
identity” and lashed out against the state. The MF/KT is perfect to delineate the causal
mechanism that connects these two variables.

Data Sources
Most of my data comes from scholarly sources. Much comes from scholar
Maldonado Aranda´s paper Stories of Drug Trafficking in Rural Mexico: Territories,
Drugs and Cartels in Michoacán. I also draw on the work of several other scholars such
as George Grayson, from whom I collected public declarations made by the Michoacán
Family in his work, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security, as
well as the work of the Tribal Analysis Center, which provided me with copies of the
Knight´s code of conduct, Code of the Knights Templar of Michoacán. I particularly draw
on the work of Falko Ernst, especially his dissertation on the Knights Templar, From
Narcotrafficking to Alternative Governance: An Ethnographic Study on Los Caballeros
Templarios and the Mutation of Organized Crime in Michoacán, Mexico.1 Much of this
scholarly work is first-hand data, composed from the personal observations of researchers
as well as collected from extensive interviews with civilian, state, and criminal

1

Ernst is a Senior Analyst at the International Crisis Group. He specializes in Mexican organized crime. He
has conducted significant research on Mexico´s state-criminal conflict through extensive interviews with
criminal, state, and civilian informants. He often serves as a commentator in national and international
media.
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informants, among them high-profile criminal figures as Nazario Moreno and Servando
Gómez.
I also draw from the work of journalists, particularly that of Ioan Grillo and
William Finnegan. Both of them covered critical moments of the conflict between the
MF/KT and the federal government on the ground in Michoacán. Their data is also firsthand, and mostly comes from Grillo´s work Gangster Warlords and Finnegan´s article
for The New Yorker, “Silver or Lead.”
Besides scholarly and journalistic works, I also collected data from social media
and music sources. I analyze some of the Facebook profiles of suspected members of the
Michoacán Family and the Knights Templar. I also analyze the lyrics of several narcoballads, songs which describe and often glorify the exploits of Mexican drug traffickers.

Process Tracing
I use process tracing to analyze my case. Process tracing is the “Systematic
examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions
and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011). I have selected process tracing
so that I can better understand the processes behind my theory.
If my theory is correct, I first expect to find social identities uniting members of
the MF/KT to the Michoacán people. I should observe the criminals and the local people
connected through identities such as socio-economic status or place of origin. I should
also observe this connection proudly embraced by criminals and observable in their
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public statements, choice of music or entertainment, and their overall self-image. This
evidence provides the foundation for my theory on anti-state criminal violence.
I next expect to find these social identities politicized by a serious grievance or
grievances enacted by state agents. This is also a necessary piece of evidence, as without
it there would be no abused civilians for criminals to avenge or defend. If I am right, I
should observe state agents abusing Michoacanos, either through human rights violations
or political or economic interference.
I expect the social identities to be politicized by the grievance(s). If I am right, I
should observe public demonstrations and protests, as well as statements of civilians and
criminals condemning the abuse while demonstrating an adversarial relationship with
state agents. Once again, this evidence is necessary for my theory.
Once the social identity is politicized, I expect to find members of organized
crime adopting a protective identity toward the Michoacán people. If I am right, I should
observe the criminals making public statements, devising rules for members, and
expending time and money to benefit their fellow Michoacanos. This evidence is not
necessary for my theory, as it is possible for members of the MF/KT to have adopted a
protective identity without making it public. They could simply demonstrate this role
through deed, attacking state agents to avenge civilian abuse or deter aggression without
saying anything about it. Nonetheless, evidence that they have accepted a protective role
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through their words, imagery, their music preferences, and what they spend their time or
money on, increases the plausibility that they have done so.
Finally, I expect criminals to attack state agents to avenge or deter state abuse of
civilians. If I am right, I should observe criminals attacking the state, not simply
defending against its incursions disrupting their criminal operations. Specifically, I
should observe them attacking unpopular state forces. I also expect to find statements or
other evidence from criminals demonstrating that the attacks are intended to protect or
avenge civilians.
If observed together, these expectations suggest that criminal organizations are
sometimes driven by their social identities to attack the state. This does not mean that
they are always driven by these identities. Rather, these identities help us to better
understand anti-state criminal violence, providing another pathway to its enactment.

Plan of Analysis
In order to develop my theory, I need to show the social identities connecting
members of the MF/KT to Michoacanos, grievances enacted by state agents, the
politicization of the social identities, the adoption of a protector identity by members of
the MF/KT, and their subsequent attacks against state forces. I therefore begin my
analysis by examining these social identities. I then proceed to analyze the conflict
between the MF/KT with the Mexican federal government. I provide some background
information before exploring state grievances, the politicization of the social identities,
and the adoption by criminals of a protector identity. I then explore the nature of the
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MF/KT’s anti-state violence. I conclude my paper discussing the limitations of the
available evidence, and how future research could improve upon my work.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF THE MICHOACÁN FAMILY AND THE KNIGHTS
TEMPLAR

The Rise of the Michoacán Family
The Michoacán Family first announced its presence in September 2006 by
dumping several heads on a dance floor in Uruapan, Michoacán (Aranda 2013). The
Michoacán Family was made up of criminals, home guard, and local vigilante units and
arose in response to the alleged predatory criminal Zetas and other criminal groups
(Aranda 2013; Ernst 2015; Finnegan 2010). Highlighting the injustice suffered by
Michoacanos, leader Nazario Moreno wrote that, “My state was being subjugated,
robbed, and humiliated by a dangerous group of professional delinquents… whose
cruelty was incomparable in the annals of narcoviolence… (and whose) savagery… was
so that they devastated and imposed terror” (Cited in Ernst 2015, 164). Declaring that
“Our sole motive is that we love our state and are no longer willing to see our people’s
dignity trampled on” and supported by local people, the Family proceeded to drive out
the Zetas and other criminal groups and to establish itself as the most wealthy and
powerful criminal group in Michoacán (Aranda 2013; Finnegan 2010; Grayson 2010b,
101; Grillo 2016).
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Figure 5-1. Map of Michoacán, Mexico. Adapted from INEGI, 2020. Retrieved from
https://www.inegi.org.mx/app/areasgeograficas/?ag=16. Copyright [2020] by the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

Ties to Home and Kinship
Members of the MF/KT called Michoacán home. It is where they grew up. It is
where their friends lived. It is where their families have lived for perhaps generations.
This is particularly true of the rough and isolated southern region of the state, known as
the Hot Land. Many criminals shared the low socioeconomic background of the
community they operated in (Ernst 2015). Proud of their local heritage, they highlighted
their connection to the area and its people. In a paid advertisement in two Michoacán
newspapers, the Michoacán Family answered the question they posed to their fellow
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Michoacanos, “Who Are We?”, by stating that they were “Workers from the Tierra
Caliente (Hot Land) region in the state of Michoacán” (Grayson 2010b).
This connection to the local appeared in official organizing documents. In the
Code of the Knights Templar of Michoacán, a handbook of rules written for the Knights
Templar, it stated the group’s ongoing patriotic purpose. “The Order foments patriotism,
expressed in pride in one's own land and its achievements and the awareness of its place
among nations and the duties towards all mankind” (Tribal Analysis Center 2013, 7).
Patriotic feeling and its encouragement were listed as not peripheral, but key aspects of
what it meant to be a Knight Templar.
This pride and sense of connection to the local has also been observable in
narcocorridos. Narcocorridos are ballads about the exploits of drug traffickers. The
songs are often written for traffickers with flattering descriptions of their deeds. These
songs therefore grant us a glimpse into how they like to personally identify. What comes
out is that they strongly favor identifying as proud Michoacános. The song, La Familia
Michoacana, stated that the group was “100% Michoacanos” (Los Tucanes de Tijuana
2010). In the song, Los Caballeros Templarios, the singer declares, “I feel proud of my
Michoacán homeland… I am from Apatzingán…I am from the Hot Land” (Los de la A
2017a). The song, Soy Michoacano, describes the life of a criminal proud to be from
Apatzingán, Michoacán, living like a king while fighting federal police and soldiers (Los
de la A 2017b). Where these criminals were from was important to their identity. It
should therefore be no surprise if this identity influenced their behavior, occasionally
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sidelining the profit motive in behalf of more altruistic motivations regarding the defense
of home and family.
This connection to Michoacán and the Hot Land as home was particularly
relevant in the naming of the Michoacán Family. Leader José de Jesús Méndez said in an
interview with federal police that, “The idea [for the name] was based mostly because of
our people and town. Which is why we called it the Family” (Truth Witness 2017).
Another leader, Nazario Moreno, wrote in his memoir, They Call Me the Craziest One:
The Diary of An Idealist2, that, “I decided to give it this name since already by definition
family is a concept that refers to a homogenous group, to a same social class, to a culture,
tradition, same blood, same lineage, same interests, and equal objectives and goals”
(Cited in Ernst 2015, 161). The name demonstrated a devotion to home.
The top leadership of the MF/KT was closely connected to Michoacán. The two
top leaders of the Michoacán Family were Nazario Moreno and José de Jesús Méndez.
Both leaders were from Michoacán, with Moreno hailing from the Hot Land and Méndez
coming from La Guardia (Ernst 2015; Truth Witness 2017). Leaders make formal and
informal rules for their groups to follow and act as role models for group members. As
long as both Moreno and Méndez remained enthusiastic about their home communities,
then even a lack of enthusiasm by some members would not matter too much in
dampening the overall affiliation of the group.
Ties of home and kinship connected members of the MF/KT with Michoacán and

2

I used Ernst’s dissertation to obtain quotes from Moreno’s book. I was unable to acquire anything from
the book otherwise as it is mostly found in Mexico and has been declared illegal to own by the Mexican
government. Ernst had to acquire the book directly through a criminal informant at much personal risk to
himself.
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its people (Ochoa & Torres 2012). They shared common social identities. These identities
provided members of organized crime with incentives beyond self-interested economic
profit. These more complicated incentives are necessary for understanding why organized
crime may engage in anti-state violence, as it broadens our understanding of their
motivations.
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CHAPTER 6
HOW THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF THE MICHOACÁN FAMILY AND THE
KNIGHTS TEMPLAR LED TO ANTI-STATE CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

The Federal Invasion of Michoacán
In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón won the presidency after a close
election. Perceiving a mandate to crack down on organized crime from the Mexican
people, he decided to start his war on crime in Michoacán, noting the power of the
Family and its aggressive use of violence in clearing Michoacán of the Zetas and other
rival criminal groups (Grillo 2016). The Mexican Army, Navy, and Federal Police
swarmed into Michoacán in December 2006 to stop the crime and violence (Aranda
2013; Finnegan 2010).
Federal forces seized weapons, drugs, and engaged in shootouts with the Family
(Grillo 2016). Hundreds of the Family’s agents were arrested (Grillo 2016). Despite
offers by the Family to end the fighting, the campaign only grew in intensity (Grillo
2016). This was especially true after two grenades were thrown into an Independence
Day celebration in Morelia in 2008, which killed 3 people and injured 111 (Aranda
2013). Despite the claims of the Family to have had nothing to do with the attack, and the
confession of Zetas admitting responsibility, federal forces continued to aggressively
pursue them (Aranda 2013; Grillo 2016).
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Federal Police Violate Citizen’s Civil and Human Rights
Despite claims to the contrary by some Mexican security officials, the federal
invasion of Michoacán was not a clean one (Grillo 2016). Both the Federal Police and the
Mexican military engaged in widespread abuse of the Michoacán population. The Federal
Police were particularly brutal. They would often arbitrarily detain people (Wolfesberger
2017). They would often steal and damage property when conducting investigations
(Ernst 2015; Finnegan 2010). According to some civilians, Federal Police also engaged in
extrajudicial executions. Such was alleged in two incidents that resulted in the death of at
least 50 civilians in 2015 (Human Rights Watch 2015). This behavior was not unique to
Michoacán. As Calderón recruited and dispatched officers throughout the country to fight
his war on the drug cartels, complaints of human rights violations increased, from 136 in
2007, to 802 in 2012 (Meyer 2014). Their behavior left Michoacanos furious. As one
informer remarked, “Look at that, the government, and one would suppose that they are
supposed to protect” (Ernst 2015, 215).
The Federal Police used torture as a method of interrogation. According to one
police officer, it was frequently used on the front lines to extract information. He claimed
not to have wanted to get involved with the torturous methods of his colleagues at first.
However, he eventually buckled and joined in, somewhat comforted by the fact that
everyone else seemed to be doing it. The police used this information to arrest suspected
criminals (Grillo 2016). What seemed ignored by the police was whether the data gleaned
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from tortured prisoners was trustworthy or not, and if it led to the arrest and torture of
innocent civilians rather than the targeted criminals they claimed to seek.

The Military Violates Citizen’s Civil and Human Rights
While the Federal Police maintained the worst reputation, the military also soiled
its own throughout the Michoacán campaign. Beginning with the invasion in 2006,
Mexican military personnel extorted people, using the many roadblocks they set up
across the state to do so (Finnegan 2010). In their determination to find criminals, they
harassed civilians in the street, threatened them, seized their property, and beat them
(Ernst 2015). They often sought suspects in total disregard for the safety of civilians,
from whom they demanded accusations (Ernst 2015). “Within six months, Mexico´s
human rights commissioner had received more than fifty complaints from Michoacán
residents of soldiers beating them with rifle butts or torturing them” (Grillo 2016, 271).
The abuse by members of the military could be particularly cruel after suffering an attack
by organized criminals. According to reporter Ioan Grillo,
In one horrific incident, four teenage girls described soldiers taking them to a base
and beating and raping them over several days. A medical examiner confirmed
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the assaults. The attack happened shortly after the ambush that killed the five
soldiers. Maybe this was the soldier´s revenge. (Grillo 2016, 271)
As the war dragged on, the military continued to rack up an increasing tally of
abuses against the Michoacán population. According to the Mexican National Human
Rights Commission,
From 1 December 2006 to 17 May 2008, 634 complaints were filed against
soldiers in Michoacán, including 250 for the improper exercise of public
functions, 221 for illegal searches, 182 for cruelty, 147 for arbitrary detentions, 85
for theft, 41 for threats, and 32 for intimidation. On 27 October 2008, the annual
report by the president of Michoacán’s Human Rights Commission affirmed that
cases of torture had surged 300 per cent in one year. (Aranda 2013, 60)
With the widespread abuse of civil and human rights, it became difficult for citizens to
trust federal forces. Rather than trust, the Federal Police and military mostly succeeded in
encouraging hostility.

Disruption of Sovereignty, the Drug Trade, and Social Welfare
The violation of citizen’s human and civil rights was not the only way in which
the federal government injured the Michoacán population. The federal government
intervened and disrupted state and local government, often in violation of the Mexican
constitution (Aranda 2013; Finnegan 2010; Ochoa & Torres 2017). They also disrupted
the economy and social welfare of the state, as both the drug trade and the welfare
projects of the MF/KT, discussed later in the chapter, had assisted in bettering both
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(Aranda 2013; Finnegan 2010; Grillo 2016). Federal disruption was understandable. The
drug trade was illegal and the members of the Family and the Knights were criminals.
Also understandable was federal distrust of state and local government, which had been
so infiltrated by criminal agents that both state and local police forces often assisted them
in attacking federal forces (Grillo 2016; Ernst 2015). Nonetheless, such incidents would
have only added to the perception among Michoacanos that they were being persecuted.
Federal forces committed serious grievances against the Michoacán population.
The Army, Navy, and Federal Police frequently violated their human and civil rights.
They damaged the economy and eliminated the popular welfare activities of the MF/KT.
They violated the constitution, and interfered in state and local politics. These grievances
provided the catalyst for the politicization of the social identities shared by Michoacanos
and members of organized crime.

Civilian Disgust and Protest at Federal Abuse
The abuse by federal forces led to dissatisfaction and hostility among
Michoacanos. The population felt discriminated against; stigmatized as criminals (Ernst
2015). One informant stated that,
When there wasn’t that much government, it was better… there weren’t that many
deaths… and there was more work… and we never had an aggression by them, by
the person(s) they [the government] call organized crime, in fact I call them all
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organized crime, the government itself… today it’s like you watch out more for
the federals (Federal Police) than for them. (Ernst 2015, 216)
In a group discussion led by researcher Falko Ernst on which was the greater evil, the
federal government or the Knights Templar, a participant replied, quickly backed up by
the other participants, that “If I had to choose, here the f* ing Templars, and there the
fucking government… which one do you want to have taken out? I’d say a thousand
times the government…” (Ernst 2015, 216). According to a Michoacán politician, the
campaign had “ruined the economy in the Hot Land and shattered the community's social
peace” (Finnegan 2010). For some Michoacanos, the federal government lost its claim to
being a legitimate source of protection and assistance.
The poor reputation of federal forces was not limited to adults, but also spread to
children. Falko Ernst, visiting an Apatzingán schoolroom conducting research on both the
Michoacán Family and the Knights Templar, noted this when examining some drawings
and activities of fifth graders.
Tellingly, the role of the aggressor was clear in the drawings: It was the little men
with the PF´s (Federal Police) typical dark blue uniforms that do the shooting and
killing. During the break, the schoolyard became the stage for the apatzingense
version of cops and robbers. In Caballeros v Federales, the latter are the bad guys.
(Ernst 2015, 213-214)
Whether children or adults, Michoacanos had little confidence in federal forces.
The Michoacán public demonstrated its dissatisfaction through protest. For
example, on 12 December 2010, 500 residents of Apatzingán demonstrated in the streets.
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They were protesting the presence of Federal Police officers. The demonstration was
sparked by a three-day battle which left residents trapped in their homes. The battle
resulted in the death of 11 people, including an 8-month old baby. Angry citizens waved
signs in the streets, demanding the withdrawal of federal forces (AFP 2010). A similar
demonstration occurred in the town of Nueva Italia. Sparked by the robbery and
vandalizing of a house during a police search, citizens poured into the streets and called
for the withdrawal of the Federal Police (Finnegan 2010). The citizenry tired of the
alleged protection offered by the federal government and its police forces.

Criminal Disgust and Protest at Federal Abuse of Civilians
The federal campaign infuriated the MF/KT and its leaders. Nazario Moreno
expressed his disgust at the attacks and attempts to ruin his and his organization's
reputation in his memoir, stating that,
What I wanted to do was realize a humanitarian and generous work, and in return,
the government and some media exhibit me… as a dangerous narco, initiating a
cruel and relentless persecution against me in the entire country, but
fundamentally in my beloved state of Michoacán. (Cited in Ernst 2015, 160)
According to Moreno and the MF/KT, while they were busy serving Michoacán, the
federal government abused it. They accused President Calderón and his party of having
captured the state and used it to “victimize and abuse innocent civilians under the pretext
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of ‘national security’, refusing to create order… and of actively colluding with the Zetas”
(Ernst 2015, 164).
In response, the MF/KT assisted civilians protest and document the abuse,
encouraging them to film federal forces abusing civilians and sending them the phone
number of Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Ernst 2015). It also
condemned the abuse. In a public statement distributed through flyers, banners, blogs,
radio stations, newspapers, and national and international news agencies in 2010, the
Family lashed out at the federal government for its treatment of the Michoacán citizenry.
It stated that,
The federal government has continued to expose its inabilities and commenced a
type of witch hunt against the innocent civilians of Michoacán. Using the excuse
of trying to do away with our organization, they have committed countless
assaults against our civil society. They have broken into and looted homes, they
have murdered and raped both men and women and have invented testimonies of
alleged protected witnesses that have caused our prisons to become filled with
innocent people charged with crimes which were never committed. (Ovemex
2010)
After making this bitter accusation, the Family offered to disband. They made the offer
on condition that the federal government would promise to protect the Michoacán people
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and cease their abuse (Ovemex 2010). The federal government, justifiably suspicious,
ignored the offer and continued the conflict.
The social identities connecting the local population to members of the MF/KT
were politicized by federal abuse. Michoacanos lost confidence in federal protection and
viewed the federal government as an enemy to be confronted rather than an ally. While
the response of some Michoacanos to the injustice was to resist through protest, some,
such as members of organized crime, may have moved toward a more aggressive
response. Instead of protest, they adopted the role of community protector, a role
accepted by some Michoacanos in the absence of adequate state protection.

The Protective Ideology of the Michoacán Family
and the Knights Templar
There is evidence that the MF/KT adopted a protective identity toward
Michoacán. Much of this stems from the early days of the MF/KT and the behavior of
their rival criminal group, the Zetas, in the early 2000s. The Zetas had spurned positive
relationships with the Michoacán people and abused them (Aranda 2013; Ernst 2015).
They established protection rackets in the drug trade and extorted licit businesses (Ernst
2015). They also supported a local market for drugs, encouraging addiction, particularly
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meth addiction (Finnegan 2010). The MF/KT justified its conflict with the Zetas in terms
of providing protection to Michoacanos from their abuse.
One sign of the MF/KT’s protective identity was the development of an ideology.
Leader Nazario Moreno believed that, in the words of one of his favorite authors, the
Christian evangelist John Eldredge,
A man must have a battle to fight, a great mission to his life that involves and yet
transcends even home and family. He must have a cause to which he is devoted
even unto death, for this is written into the fabric of his being. (Eldredge 2001,
141)
One cause for which the MF/KT seemed determined to demonstrate their dedication to
was the protection of Michoacán. In one of its first public statements, the MF/KT
declared that its mission was to
Eradicate from the state of Michoacán kidnapping, extortion in person and by
telephone, paid assassinations, express kidnapping, tractor-trailer and auto theft,
home robberies done by people like those mentioned, who have made the state of
Michoacán an unsafe place. Our sole motive is that we love our state and are no
longer willing to see our people’s dignity trampled on. (Grayson 2010b)
A key part of the ideology of the MF/KT was the need for Michoacán to be safe from its
enemies. Its declared mission was to provide this safety.
However, their ideology allegedly went deeper than only protecting Michoacán.
Nazario Moreno claimed that he saw his group as a “social movement,” one which he
wished to unite with “all the isolated social struggles developing in Mexico and other
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countries… to make one sole, powerful, and inexorable social earthquake which would
once and for all liberate all the peoples of the world” (Cited in Ernst 2015, 151). It was
meant to “make society egalitarian and end injustices and … renovate the legal structures
maintaining the poor… (in) misery and the rich well defended in their immense wealth
(Cited Ernst 2015, 163). Moreno ensured that his recruits were exposed and indoctrinated
in this ideology, sending them to training camps where, besides learning combat and
other necessary trafficking skills, they received ideological training through seminars and
the reading of required books such as his own work, Pensamientos, as well as the works
of evangelical Christian authors.
It is of course possible that this protective ideology was simply propaganda,
hardly accepted at all by either criminals or civilians alike. Many Michoacanos
questioned the sincerity of the criminals (Ernst 2015). While there is evidence that the
MF/KT did try to limit the exploitation of local communities by its members, the effort
was not always successful (Ernst 2015; Grayson 2010b). There were also members of the
MF/KT that seemed limited in their ideological motivations. They saw their protective
role as much more instrumental than identity-based. For example, leader Servando
Gómez explained the motivation for developing good relations with the civilian
population to be more about the civilians protecting them than the other way around.
If I treated them badly, they would put a bullet in me, they would betray/report
me… It's like if you have a family, a wife… you treat her badly and they won’t
respect you, she´ll leave you or, just the same, put a bullet in you… without the
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support of the people, without them protecting us, we would have never have
lasted this long. (Ernst 2015, 171)
Such a sentiment is far from the altruistic sense of duty claimed by the MF/KT to
motivate its members.
Nonetheless, there do appear to be members of the MF/KT that fully believed in
their claimed sense of mission of providing protection. Not least of these is Nazario
Moreno, who, as noted by Ernst, frequently appeared to express frustration at Gómez´s
more pragmatic approach to civilian relationships (Ernst 2015). The welfare of civilians
was not simply a means to an end, but an end worthy in and of itself.
Beyond leadership, there are also members who truly appeared to buy into the
mission. For lower ranking members, life was often difficult. A lower ranking officer
noted, speaking of his daily life as a Knight Templar, that,
In the mountains, things get rough. One has to carry food, water and things like
that. Sometimes you get tired of living like that, wandering around. You have to
hang out with commandos and people who are very strict. That stresses you out.
Our salary is very low, we don't earn much… When the situation is difficult,
when we are in a battle or something it can be two or three months without any
time off. (Ernst 2019)
Despite the difficult lifestyle, he said that he felt that what he was doing was right. He
explained, “But the thing is, one is fighting for a just cause” (Ernst 2019). He said that he
joined the group because, “There were people who were damaging the community. They
killed a lot of people; they were killing innocents and stuff like that. They didn't let
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people into the city to do errands, things like that” (Ernst 2019). Reflecting on the
purpose of his group, he stated that “It is about defending the state (of Michoacán), and
because they come and want to do things their way, selling drugs and stuff…and
…kidnapping, they do whatever they want. That is why we are at war with them” (Ernst
2019). It therefore seems likely that this protective ideology did inspire some members to
endure the hardships of the trafficker lifestyle.
It is also fair to note that even members who hold to Gómez´s more pragmatic
instrumental approach are still incentivized to defend Michoacán communities from the
depredations of the Zetas, other criminal groups, and the federal government. There are
many benefits that can accrue to an organization that adopts a protective role. An official
protective role can assist with establishing discipline, recruiting new members, and
gaining civilian support. Even if members do not sincerely buy into the protector identity,
the actions of their group and its statements identifying them as protectors should lead
them to behave as such anyway. This is especially true if the group depends on noncriminal Michoacán civilians to help protect it and its criminal activities. Civilians may
expect a return of the favor, which may therefore lead even a pragmatic or selfish
criminal to attack enemies who abuse civilians in order to demonstrate their commitment.

The Codification of the Ideology and the Rise
of the Knights Templar
Following the alleged death of Nazario Moreno at the hands of Federal Police in
December 2010, the cohesion of the Michoacán Family was temporarily shattered
(Aranda 2013; Grillo 2016). It split into two factions, one led by Jesús Méndez and the
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other secretly by an alive Nazario Moreno. Both sides claimed to have turned on the other
for having betrayed the traditions of the Michoacán Family, by preying on the local
population through kidnapping and extortion (Ernst 2015; Grillo 2016). Moreno
succeeded in defeating Méndez, who was soon captured by federal forces (Ernst 2015;
Grillo 2016). With the organization now under his firm control, Moreno reorganized it
and named it the Knights Templar, after the Medieval Christian warriors who devoted
themselves to protecting visitors to the Holy Land as well as its sacred sites and relics.
The Knights Templar embraced the protective ideology of the Michoacán Family
(Martinez 2012). Conversations with its leaders revealed a continued sense of
responsibility for the social order of Michoacán, with leaders frequently referring to
themselves as the government (Ernst 2015). The group also frequently referred to
leadership as pastors (Ernst 2015). Such a title connected them and their responsibilities,
at least rhetorically, to religious leaders responsible for the spiritual well-being of their
congregations. The Knights Templar codified this ideology to better help members
internalize the protective role. It also would have helped signal to civilians their desire to
be allies.
The Knights Templar codified their mission and general rules of conduct in a
booklet called the Code of the Knights Templar of Michoacán. Regarding the group’s
sense of mission and purpose, the booklet stated that it was, “To protect the inhabitants
and the sacred territory of the free state, sovereign and secular of Michoacán” (Tribal
Analysis Center 2013, 1). Each member had to believe in God and serve him and his
neighbor. They were commanded to fight against materialism, injustice, and tyranny
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(Tribal Analysis Center 2013). They were to defend the moral values necessary for the
sustenance of society (Tribal Analysis Center 2013). Finally, they were to “always fight
in protection of the oppressed, the widow and the orphan,” as well as to protect the civil
rights of man, “recognizing the right of peoples and nations to govern themselves”
(Tribal Analysis Center 2013, 5-6). The Knights Templar were supposed to protect
Michoacán physically, spiritually, and politically.
The handbook demanded that members were to avoid predatory behavior. The
code stated that members were “strictly prohibited” from engaging in kidnappings to
obtain money (Tribal Analysis Center 2013, 14). It stated that they were never to kill for
money (Tribal Analysis Center 2013). Any killing had to be authorized by the highest
authorities in the organization (Tribal Analysis Center 2013). Finally, the code stated
that, “No woman should fear anything of a Templar, nor his words nor actions. No child
should suffer this fear either. No man should fear a Templar, on the contrary he should
feel his protection” (Tribal Analysis Center 2013, 8). The Knights were to always
remember their duty as protectors and never to become predators, especially of their
fellow Michoacanos.
The code also suggested that members were to provide assistance, starting with
those in their home communities. This extended beyond simply providing spiritual,
physical, and political protection. The code stated that, “Where there is weakness, the
Templar should bring his force. Where there is no voice, the Templar should raise his.
Where poverty is greatest, there the Templar should distribute his generosity” (Tribal
Analysis Center 2013, 20). They were to provide welfare to those in need. They were to
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be advocates for the disadvantaged in society. While such lofty sentiments are surprising
and were an aspiration infrequently achieved in a group accustomed to murder, extortion,
and other corrupt practices, they nonetheless did appear to be influential in the care that
MF/KT members demonstrated to those considered their kin and comrades.

A Revolutionary and Christian Warrior Tradition
Besides a protective ideology, members of the MF/KT also saw themselves as a
part of a long tradition of revolutionary and Christian warriors. This association is notable
throughout their messaging, training, imagery, and pastimes. A good example of this in
writing comes from Moreno’s memoir. In a closing note written after his alleged first
death in 2010, his comrades wrote that he died for a cause worth dying for akin to
revolutionary characters such as Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa, and Che Guevara
(Ernst 2015). Often, revolutionary messages such as this would appear in group training
and were obviously intended to be adopted into the identities of members. For example,
Moreno expected his soldiers-in-training to watch the film Braveheart, which tells the
story of the Scottish rebel William Wallace in his fight against the English tyrant Edward
Longshanks (Grillo 2016). However, instead of defending Scotland from English
tyranny, Moreno’s men were to protect Michoacán from the predations of its enemies
(Grayson 2010b).
Revolutionary and Christian warrior imagery was also frequently used,
particularly by the Knights Templar. For example, in a video created by leader Servando
Gómez, his desk was littered with revolutionary images. It included a book titled Che y
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Fidel alongside large pictures of Che Guevara, Emiliano Zapata, and Francisco Villa
(Martinez 2012). Examining the Facebook pages of members, or at least those who
admire them, I found images of Knights Templar from the Middle Ages dominating
pages alongside images of famous revolutionaries and of men armed with weapons,
occasionally shown honoring religious belief or family in some way. Images of San
Nazario, the folk saint image of the allegedly dead Nazario Moreno as a defender of the
poor, also frequently appeared. One image I found suggested that among some the
affiliation with the original Knights Templar was deeper than I had thought, as it
commemorated the death of the final Grand Master of the Templar Order, Jacques de
Molay in the year 1314 (Facebook accounts of Gallito Aguilar, Luis Daniel Gomes
Carrillo, Camarrillo Cesar Julio, & Daniel Carrillo 2020).
The self-image of MF/KT members as revolutionary warriors was particularly
notable in the infamous narcocorridos. The music often depicted leadership heroically.
For example, Nazario Moreno is described as a reluctant warrior fighting against rival
criminal groups and a federal government concerned only about protecting the interests
of the rich and preying on his people (El Komander 2011; Quintero 2017). His role as a
narcotics trafficker was downplayed, and his connection through common cause with
Mexican and Latin American revolutionary figures such as Fidel Castro, Che Guevara,
Francisco Villa, José María Morelos, and Emiliano Zapata were highlighted (Plancarte
2014; Quintero 2017). Narcocorridos painted members of the MF/KT as both
revolutionary and protective of their homes.
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Fighting Crime and Providing Community Services
Armed with their grandiose ideology and protective attitude, the members of
MF/KT provided their Michoacán communities with services. These services occupied
their time and money, and they were quite willing to dedicate much of both toward their
provision.
One service that they offered was security and the safeguarding of public order. A
former governor of Michoacán, Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, described how the MF/KT would
introduce themselves into communities.
I would get a call afterward from the mayor. Ten pickup trucks full of armed men
had arrived at the municipality. The local police could do nothing. They were
outgunned. But the criminals were very respectful. They would tell the mayor
‘We want to work here. There will be no trouble, no crime, no drunkenness,
nothing.’ Then they would take over the town, and enforce their rules. If a boy hit
his mother, they would punish him and dump him in the plaza for people to see. If
he did it again, they would kill him. It was a strategy to gain popular sympathy,
and it worked. (Finnegan 2010)
While many Michoacanos were not necessarily ecstatic about the law and order offered
by the MF/KT, they often found it to be fair and were willing to tolerate it in the absence
of better security (Ernst 2015).
Members of the MF/KT investigated and punished a wide variety of crimes. They
promised to end extortion and kidnapping (Finnegan 2010). In the city of Zitácuaro, they
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promised to end loan sharking (Finnegan 2010). They investigated and punished robbing,
raping, and other anti-social crimes (Ernst 2015; Grillo 2016).
Members of the MF/KT were draconian in their pursuance of crime and punishing
criminals. Often, they would make their victims’ punishment public to humiliate them. In
one instance, in the town of Zamora, “The mob made a line of alleged criminals march
through the main street in the evening. They had no shirts, showing deep whip marks on
their backs, and carried signs admitting their crimes” (Grillo 2016, 261). For serious
crimes, alleged criminals were often brutally executed in public fashion.
One example is the abduction of an alleged rapist from a police convoy who was,
the following day, found crucified on a street sign, his genitals cut off and stuffed
into his mouth as a warning to other rapists – “eso me pasó por violador” [this
happened to me for [being a] rapist] – attached to his chest with ice picks. (Ernst
2015, 183)
While claiming to protect Michoacanos, members of the MF/KT did not shy away from
committing human rights abuses in pursuit of their idea of order.
Despite the brutality, there was some local support or at least acceptance and
toleration for this alternative justice system (Grillo 2016; Ochoa & Torres 2012). Some
noted that it did help lower some forms of crime. An informant stated that “there used to
be a lot of rape, but not anymore…” (Ernst 2015, 185). While civilians were not
necessarily pleased with the harsh methods of the MF/KT, some found them to be more
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effective than the imperfect work of local police (Ernst 2015; Finnegan 2010; Ochoa &
Torres 2012).
Similar to their crime fighting efforts, members of the MF/KT also assisted
residents protecting their property. They acted as a debt collection service. “If people
were owed money, they could go to the Family, who made sure they got paid… If people
didn’t cough up, the cartel would take their houses and force them into exile” (Grillo
2016, 261). A Michoacán schoolteacher explained that if you needed a debt collected,
you could go to the MF/KT and it would help you collect on it. The police often
cooperated, dropping off debtors to the MF/KT which then ensured the payment of the
debt (Finnegan 2010). While true that a third of the debt was usually taken as payment
for its assistance, the very threat of criminal enforcement would have deterred debtors
from reneging and would have helped Michoacanos regain lost money without having to
make a call (Finnegan 2010).
The MF/KT claimed to take special care of vulnerable members of their
communities. This was particularly true of women, whose protection the Knights
Templar demanded in their official code of conduct (Tribal Analysis Center 2013).
Alleged wife-beaters were threatened and punished. Husbands were sometimes forced to
stay in relationships, or to pay alimony or give up real estate to their wives in instances of
separation and divorce (Ernst 2015). Such actions aligned well with the MF/KT’s stated
objective of providing protection and assistance.
The MF/KT promised to protect Michoacán communities from drugs. This may
seem like a contradiction. Drug trafficking was its main source of revenue after all.
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However, while the MF/KT had no ethical qualms with shipping and selling drugs in the
United States, it did when it came to local communities. It opposed the sale and
consumption of the most dangerous drugs in Michoacán, particularly meth, whose selling
and consumption it banned throughout the state (Grayson 2010b). While surprising, local
Michoacanos confirmed the truth of it (Grillo 2016). Part of this might have been due to
the personal experiences of Nazario Moreno, who had suffered from addiction earlier in
his life and did not want his fellow Michoacanos to go through the same experience
(Grillo 2016). This drug strategy was in stark contrast to that of the Zetas, who had been
all too happy to encourage the use and selling of meth and other drugs in the local
Michoacán market.
For those who did fall into the snare of drugs and alcohol, the MF/KT provided
the opportunity for rehabilitation. According to leader Servando Gómez, “We go to
communities and we assemble all the rateros (low-life criminals) and the drug addicts and
we give them chats, we even use psychologists to give them chats… we put them in
seminars” (Ernst 2015, 176-177). Some Michoacanos were pleased with these
rehabilitation programs. One woman, who had been concerned about her 16-year old son,
explained that,
He was spending all of his time on the street… he was drinking all the time, he
was on the wrong path… they locked him up a couple of times for longer times
and then they put him to work… they gave him courses with psychologists and
everything… they do exercises of self-reflection, they make them open up and tell
their life stories… they make them see that they have to (live together) with their
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families… that they must behave well at home…el señor (the local boss) really
cares about them… (Ernst 2015, 176-177)
With their anti-drug efforts frequently well-received, the MF/KT proceeded to set up
rehabilitation centers and programs throughout Michoacán, with some of them granted
official non-profit status (Ernst 2015).
These rehabilitation centers were not devoid of abuse and violence. One young
man recounted his experience with one of these programs. He and a group of other young
men were taken to a warehouse outside of town. In between prayers and the studying of
inspirational Christian works, they were forced to watch videos in which MF/KT
members tortured, mutilated, and decapitated people. They were threatened with the same
if they failed to shape up their lives (Ernst 2015). Once finished, the MF/KT hosted
celebrations for those it now deemed fit to return to their communities.
Besides stopping major crime and addiction, the MF/KT attempted to stop minor
crimes and public nuisances as well. Members punished traffic violations and public
drunkenness. They cracked down on excessively loud behavior, banning music after
certain hours (Ernst 2015). An extreme example was their reaction to donkeys roaming
freely in the town of Holanda. They claimed that they did not want the animals running
loose, invading people's property and eating their plants. They warned the owners to
control them. However, the owners mostly ignored them. Eventually, they were able to
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clear the streets of the donkeys. However, they accomplished this self-appointed task by
killing them all (Ernst 2015).
The MF/KT enforced its regime using a wide range of methods. It usually started
out with talks. If talking to the delinquents failed to change their behavior, then members
would usually move on toward physical punishment and public humiliation (Ernst 2015).
They might apprehend someone and become extremely threatening. An informant
explained, “For instance, when a muchacho offends and steals something or so… in a van
they drive him around in a plastic bag, they kick him… pour cold water on him and drive
him back and forth through the ranch” (Ernst 2015, 183). Sometimes delinquents were
apprehended and held prisoner for days or weeks. They were often blindfolded, beaten,
threatened with decapitation and dismemberment, and forced to endure mock executions
(Ernst 2015).
The MF/KT supported civil society and community projects. It built volleyball
courts and auditoriums (Finnegan 2010). It built schools and clinics (Ernst 2015). It
assisted in co-financing popular housing projects (Ernst 2015). It even helped protect
national resources. For example, the regional logging industry was poorly regulated. The
MF/KT confronted and fined legal and illegal loggers for deforestation (Finnegan 2010).
While it is possible that the MF/KT fined them simply to make more money, it is not
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impossible to see this as a protective action, as time invested in drug trafficking would
have been much more profitable than fining loggers.
The MF/KT hosted parties and other celebrations for the people of Michoacán.
Indicating the central plaza of the city, an Apatzingán newspaperwoman explained that
“We used to see the leaders of the Family here all the time” (Finnegan 2010).
They would come through on horses in the evening. El Chayo (Nazario
Moreno) rode a Percheron with a braided mane. That horse was worth three
million pesos. They threw huge parties, with beautiful floral arrangements. Guest
artists. Everybody came and danced. El Chayo is very gallant, very polite. Not too
tall. He has a strong presence. (Finnegan 2010)
On Mother’s Day some local bosses provided feasts and parties for moms. On Children’s
Day some would provide toys and parties with clowns (Ernst 2015). Some bosses would
take responsibility for hosting the Fiesta del Pueblo, a holiday commemorating the
founding of a community (Ernst 2015). The MF/KT took great care to honor the
traditions and holidays that were important to its members and fellow Michoacanos.
Besides their ability to throw great parties, members of the MF/KT also provided
social welfare. This was particularly appreciated by local politicians. They provided
medical assistance (Ernst 2015). One Michoacán politician explained that, “If you were
sick and had no money, they´d take you to the hospital and pay for medicine” (Finnegan
2010). They would provide people with food, either at discounted prices or for free (Ernst
2015; Finnegan 2010). They would also help people acquire items for improving their
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ability to work, such as agricultural machinery (Ernst 2015). This welfare assisted the
often poverty-stricken Michoacanos live better lives.

Avoiding Injurious Behavior
Members of the MF/KT generally avoided behavior damaging to their local
communities. When the Zetas dominated the region in the early 2000s, they often
engaged in predatory behavior, such as extorting local businesses. Things changed after
the MF/KT drove them out. An Apatzingán politician explained that she had talked to the
group’s leaders, helping them to understand that forcing small businesses to pay
protection money would seriously damage the local economy. Unlike the Zetas, who did
not have local loyalties or connections, the MF/KT agreed. Extortion in the community
ended, as well as activities such as kidnapping for ransom (Finnegan 2010).
The responsiveness of the MF/KT to local community needs earned praise (AFP
2010). Even Mexican President Calderón admitted the friendliness and generosity of at
least some of the criminals (Grillo 2016). As noted by one local politician, “everybody
here has sympathy with the Michoacán Family” (Finnegan 2010). Later, the Knights
Templar would codify this avoidance of injurious behavior as a rule in their handbook on
personal conduct (Tribal Analysis Center 2013).
The claim that MF/KT members avoided injurious behavior can be challenged
however. There are in fact many documented instances of MF/KT agents abusing the
Michoacano population that they allegedly protected. For example, in the town of
Zitácuaro, Michoacán, MF/KT members kidnapped and extorted members of the
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community for money. Unsurprisingly, some Michoacanos did not buy into their
moralism or alleged desire to protect their local communities (Finnegan 2010). The
MF/KT also monopolized the drug trade and taxed those involved in it, eliminating some
of the freedom that once existed in drug trafficking (Ernst 2015). Some locals were
convinced that the MF/KT killed people just to kill them (Ernst 2015). How do examples
of abusive conduct make sense if at least some of the MF/KT were sincere in desire to be
community protectors?
First, some of the abuse might have occurred because not every community in
Michoacán fully qualified as being a part of the local community that the MF/KT had
sworn to protect. According to journalist William Finnegan, “In the Hot Land, … the
Family definitely has a social base. The Army and the federal police sent in by Calderón
are seen as hated occupiers. In Zitácuaro, at the eastern end of Michoacán, the Family is
the hated occupier” (Finnegan 2010). Therefore, rather than indiscriminately abusing
members of their own community, members of the MF/KT were selectively abusing
those outside of it.
This difference between the Michoacanos in the Hot Land and Zitácuaro appears
to have had something to do with social class. As one Michoacán politician explained,
speaking of Zitácuaro, “They are seen as rich there” (Finnegan 2010). It is not a surprise
if richer Michoacanos were placed outside of the rural and poor identity that connected
many members of organized crime to their fellow Michoacanos (Ernst 2015). Therefore,
members of the MF/KT may still have thought of themselves as protectors of their local
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communities, even if their image of the local did not extend to all people and
communities in Michoacán in practice as one may be led to believe by their messaging.
Second, some of the abuse, especially indiscriminate abuse that failed to
distinguish between local community members and outsiders as targets of criminal acts,
may have resulted from the changing ranks of the membership. This is particularly true of
the Knights Templar. As noted previously, one incentive for the Zetas to engage in
predatory behavior toward the local population was their lack of connections to
Michoacán (Finnegan 2010). While the Knights Templar were originally composed of
local Michoacanos, this changed due to the war. A local informant explained that many
of the original leadership had been arrested or killed (Ernst 2015). They were replaced
with outsiders who were often much more willing to abuse and coerce local people and to
use their power arbitrarily to benefit a shrinking number of benefactors (Ernst 2015). It
may have been this change in membership and their abandonment of a protective identity
which ultimately led to the group’s rejection by its former supporters and its fall from
power at the hands of rival criminals, vigilante groups, and federal forces as citizens grew
less tolerant of the increasingly indiscriminate abuse.
It is also possible that some MF/KT members abused civilians because the
MF/KT had insufficient mechanisms for punishing indiscipline. The inability to
discipline members is a trait that has been observed in some other non-state actor groups
(Humphreys & Weinstein 2006). Members may be particularly incentivized to abuse
civilians if their organization does not need civilian financial support, which as drug
traffickers, the MF/KT members often did not. However, there is evidence that the
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MF/KT was able and willing to discipline members. Members were punished for failure
to abide by group standards (Ernst 2015). For example, several MF/KT members were
accused by non-criminal civilians of having stolen goods from them. After verifying their
guilt, the MF/KT returned the stolen goods, lectured the perpetrators, and then executed
them (Grayson 2010b).
Finally, it may be that the MF/KT was driven by strategic necessity to engage in
more indiscriminately abusive behavior in order to maintain itself (Wood 2010). For
example, it is possible that U.S. law enforcement efforts, such as “Project Coronado”
which resulted in the arrest of 1,200 people, disrupted MF/KT distribution networks
enough that they turned to predatory activities to sustain their cash flows (Grillo 2016;
U.S. Department of Justice 2009). This by no means suggests that members desires to
protect their communities were insincere. If they believed their organization to be a
community benefit, then temporary injurious action toward the community to help them
continue their long-term protection and money-making efforts would have been justified.
A protective identity may therefore have continued within the organization even if more
predatory and indiscriminate abusive behavior became increasingly common.
The evidence that the MF/KT had adopted a protective identity of Michoacán
does not prove that this identity had an empirical impact on anti-state violence. Such kind
of water tight evidence (what Collier (2011) calls a “smoking gun”) is hard to find.
Nonetheless, it is persuasive enough to suggest it certainly influenced it. Members were
willing to use time and money to serve their communities. They engaged in violence
against abusive criminal groups that damaged the community. In the case of those
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members who reformed their faction of the Family into the Knights Templar, they tried to
destroy half of their former organization for allegedly failing to protect the community.
They followed this up by adopting the use of symbols and formal rules intensifying their
commitment to a protective identity. It would not be surprising to find members once
again acting on this identity, attacking federal forces to avenge abuse or deter its future
occurrence.

Anti-State Violence
The MF/KT was unlikely to only pursue peaceful means to discourage federal
abuse of civilians. Well-armed and organized, it was in an excellent position to use
violence to discourage, deter, and avenge it.
The MF/KT aggressively attacked federal forces. Using guerrilla tactics, members
ambushed and killed police, soldiers, and marines (Aranda 2013; Ernst 2015). They were
frequently successful, sometimes killing high-ranking officers (Aranda 2013). Some of
these attacks have been large-scale assaults requiring extensive coordination. One such
attack involved simultaneous assaults on 16 Federal Police stations (Aranda 2013). Some
attacks have involved hundreds of criminal soldiers (Grillo 2016). These attacks often
resulted in high casualties, although these were downplayed by the federal government.
One criminal informant went so far as to claim that 50 Federal Police officers had been
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killed at a particular ambush point, which is a death count far higher than anything the
federal government has ever released (Ernst 2015).
Some of these attacks targeted particularly unpopular forces. A Michoacán
politician described one such attack against a unit of Federal Police staying at a hotel.
There was a big group of federal police staying there…Fifty, sixty guys. They
weren’t popular. They were always around, with their guns. People were afraid to
go near the hotel. Then there was a big attack, in July, when the Family was
attacking the federals all over Michoacán… The federals left the next day. Now
they camp at the airport. (Finnegan 2010)
As unpopular forces often gained this reputation through abusive conduct toward
civilians, these attacks may have been intended to avenge the abuse or deter its future
occurrence.
Unpopular forces were increasingly made up of Federal Police. Stung by the
involvement of soldiers in abusive conduct, some military leaders sought to repair the
damage by ceasing their aggressive crackdowns on organized crime (Ernst 2015).
According to one soldier, superiors told them that, “the war on drug trafficking was a
fight amongst brothers” and to remember that they “all are Mexicans.” This often meant
that units were told to stand down until action had subsided somewhat (Ernst 2015, 210).
Having worked out at least tacit understandings with some of the military leadership, the
MF/KT was able to focus its efforts on the Federal Police.
Some of the violence did appear to deter federal agents from abusing the
population. A civilian informant stated that the abusive conduct of Federal Police had
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decreased “ever since they (meaning members of the MF/KT) killed a bunch of them”
(Ernst 2015, 215). Whether this was intended or not is unknown. The MF/KT is oddly
silent in explicitly stating that its violence is intended to deter or avenge federal abuse of
civilians. If not explicit, the MF/KT has nonetheless implied as much, demanding that
Federal Police officers leave the state and that they respect Michoacanos if they also
wished to be respected (Ernst 2015; Grayson 2010b).
There is plenty of evidence that the MF/KT engaged in extensive anti-state
violence. It was offensive, not defensive in nature. It often targeted unpopular state
forces, forces that often gained their negative reputation through their abuse or hostility
toward civilians. There is even some anecdotal evidence that this anti-state violence
deterred federal abuse of civilians. While the evidence provided bolsters my theory’s
plausibility, it is far from conclusive. Due to the anecdotal nature of some of the
evidence, and because there are other good reasons for offensive anti-state violence,
further research into the decision-making process and motivations of organized criminals
is needed.

58
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION

The MF/KT’s position as Michoacán´s most powerful criminal organization
ended as its interactions with the local population became increasingly predatory
(Heineman 2015; Grillo 2016; Kennedy 2019). In response, citizens formed self-defense
groups and, together with rival criminal groups and federal forces, broke the MF/KT’s
hold on Michoacán, capturing and killing the leadership (Grillo 2016). While the MF/KT
continues to exist as the Knights Templar, it is in a notably diminished form.
I began this paper with a review of the literature on anti-state criminal violence.
These approaches are limited, as they assume that criminal anti-state violence is primarily
a function of self-interested, economic motivations and incentives. I relaxed these
assumptions, presenting a civil defense model as another explanation for both the onset
and intensity of criminal anti-state violence. I argued that organized crime will commit
anti-state violence when state enforcement agents commit a serious grievance against the
local population with whom the criminals share a social identity. I used the Michoacán
Family and the Knights Templar to study causal mechanisms of anti-state violence.
I found my theory plausible. Members of the Michoacán Family and the Knights
Templar shared common social identities with local civilians. The abusive conduct of
federal forces politicized these identities, resulting in hostility and protest from civilians
and from the MF/KT. The MF/KT adopted a protective identity toward Michoacán and
its people. Finally, the MF/KT engaged in widespread offensive violence against the
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federal government, often targeting unpopular forces. The MF/KT occasionally implied
that this violence was intended to protect civilians. There is some anecdotal evidence
which suggests that it may have also deterred abusive federal conduct toward civilians.
That the MF/KT attacked federal forces is beyond dispute. Some of it may even
have served as a deterrent. However, I lack the evidence sufficient to confirm that at least
some of it was to protect the Michoacán population by avenging and deterring federal
abuse. Even more explicit public statements claiming attacks were to protect civilians
from the federal government would be insufficient. Such statements may have only
served as propaganda and had no empirical impact on their anti-state violence. As noted
in the literature review, there are also other reasons that could explain anti-state criminal
violence. The evidence gathered for this thesis, however, suggests that it is at least
plausible that some of this violence was to protect civilians.
I suggest two avenues for future research. First, collect private criminal
information not intended for public consumption, such as email correspondence between
criminals. Criminals are more likely to demonstrate their motivations and decisionmaking processes honestly when they are not incentivized to put on a show for civilians.
Second, check to see if there is a correlation between anti-state criminal violence and the
abusive conduct of state forces, controlling for both the degree to which state forces
repress organized crime and the corruption of state forces. If organized criminal groups
attack state forces to discourage their abuse, then this should play out in a quantitative
analysis with obvious empirical results.
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